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Cautionary Tales About Technology,
Investment, and the Heritage of
Humankind
J.M. SPECTAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP)1 is
intensifying the polemics over access to technology and the expected
benefits of genomics research and development.2 As a result of the
previous North-South3 Resource Regime Negotiations, some are
already dubbing the human genome the new common heritage of
* Ph.D., Claremont Graduate University, 1999; M.A.P., Claremont Graduate School,
1997; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1992; M.A., George Washington University,
1992; M.B.A., Frostburg State University, 1989; B.A., University of La Verne, 1989; GCE
(Advanced Level), Cameroon College of Arts, Science & Technology (Africa), 1984; Associate
Professor of Law & Assistant Dean of Students, University of La Verne College of Law. This
Article is dedicated to my parents.
1. Alastair T. Iles, The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights
Framework, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27,29 (1996).
2. Id. at 32-35.
3. The term "North" is often used to designate the advanced or developed
industrial-technological countries of North America, Europe, and Japan, while the term
"South" designates the developing nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
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humankind (CHH). 4 This Article examines the promise of the CHH
approach for a genomics regime 5 and the difficulties of reconciling
CHH approaches with the imperatives of technology development,
investment security, and controversial technology transfer
provisions, 6 which have often imperiled the likelihood of substantive
agreements.
7
While placing the human genome under common heritage
governance 8 in a binding convention may be justifiable and/or
desirable, such an arrangement could be controversial and perhaps
counter-productive. Specifically, the inclusion of stringent
technology transfer provisions, and the perception that the CHH
undermines investment security and retards technological
development,9 often precipitate rejection of binding commonage
agreements. 10 In effect, technology and investment are critical
variables in understanding, explaining, and predicting the likelihood
of public and private U.S. support for a binding international
convention on the human genome. 11 This Article concludes with
recommendations designed to achieve many of the normative
aspirations of common heritage governance, while maximizing
prospects for crucial U.S. support of a prospective international
convention on the human genome.
Part II of this Article outlines the history and purpose of the
HGP and the imminent revolutionary changes and scientific benefits
4. See infra Part III. The CHH "principle has become the leitmotif in the
progressive development of international law governing the use" of common
areas/resources, and it purports to create obligations for states to use these areas/resources
for "the well-being of mankind as a whole." LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 400-01 (1994). The CHH
harks back to the civil law concept of res communes, denoting "things common to all; that
is, those things which are used and enjoyed by every one, even in single parts, but can
never be exclusively acquired as a whole, e.g., light and air." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
1304-05 (6th ed. 1990). See also Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should Hold Property Rights to
the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 219,245-47 (1997)(arguing that the human genome is a common heritage of
humankind).
5. See infra Part II.
6. J.M. Spectar, Elephants, Donkeys, or Other Creatures? Presidential Election
Cycles and International Law of the Global Commons, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 975, 992-
93 (2000).
7. Id.
8. See Sturges, supra note 4, at 223,245.
9. Id. at 242,244.
10. See Spectar, supra note 6, at 1002-08.
11. Id.
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at the dawn of the "Genomic Age." Part III discusses the increasing
acceptance and use of the common heritage principle as a means of
achieving international equity and access to the fruits of the genome.
Part IV analyzes the attempt to employ CHH principles in the
seabed and moon regimes12 to illustrate the difficulties and the limits
of common heritage governance given the competing commercial
interests in technology development and investment security. Part V
discusses the lessons learned from technology and investment
variables in resource regime negotiations and Part VI recommends
guidelines for developing a viable CHH framework for the human
genome. These recommendations to drafters of a prospective
genome convention are designed to protect the genome as common
heritage, without imperiling the prospects for agreement by
jeopardizing the development of technology and investment security.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND ITS
ANTICIPATED BENEFITS
The human organism is made of cells containing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that are organized into twenty-three
pairs of chromosomes. 13 Each chromosome has hundreds of codes
for building proteins.14 Genes are functional segments of the
double-stranded, helix-shaped DNA molecules that make up
chromosomes; they direct the assembly of every cell in the body. 15
Genes generate proteins by transcribing their codes into single-
stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) molecules, which serve as
templates for protein construction. 16 Every one of the billions of
cells in the body (except for red blood cells) contains a copy of the
same DNA.17 The totality of genetic material contained in any
12. See generally Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 96th Cong. 93 (1980) [hereinafter Senate Moon Treaty
Hearings] (statement of S. Neil Hosenball, Chairman, U.S. Delegation, U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1979; General Counsel, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
13. Antonio Regalado, Mining the Genome, TECH. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1999,
http://www.techreview.com/articles/oct99/regalado.htm. For more information about the
Human Genome Project, see About the Human Genome Project at
http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/about.html (last modified Feb. 28, 2001).
14. Id.
15. Sharon Begley, Decoding the Human Body, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 52, 61.
16. Id. at 53, 61.
17. Id. at 53.
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one cell of a particular organism is its genome. 18 Human DNA
consists of 3.2 billion chemical letters in a seemingly endless four-
letter alphabet (ATCG), 19 with each representing a molecule, and
together constituting a code: A-adenine, T-thymine, C-
cytosine, and G-guanine. 20 Nevertheless, only about 3% of the
3.2 billion chemical letters actually spell out the approximately
30,000 human genes. 21 These genes, or instructional codes, order
the special machinery inside a human cell to snatch particular
amino acids that are combined to create proteins that may lead to
the expression of certain traits, conditions, dispositions, or
tendencies. 22 The HGP seeks to decipher the precise chemical
sequence of the ATCGs that makes up the DNA of each cell of
every human body, thus documenting the human genetic
roadmap.2
3
For a consortium of about 1,100 biologists, computer
scientists, and technicians from at least half-a-dozen countries,
sequencing the human genome is at the top of the research
agenda. 24 The U.S. government and Britain's Wellcome Trust
financed the $250 million project, making it the most expensive
biology project in world history. 25 The public sector of the project
included scientists at the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH),
the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Human Genome
Research Institute, and several university* labs.26  Not to be
outdone, private genomics companies have also played key roles in
complementing or extending the work of the public project.
27
While the entire public project will be completed by 2003 (well
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. About the Human Genome Project, supra note 13. It was previously thought that
there were about 80,000-100,000 genes. Regalado, supra note 13; Begley, supra note 15, at
53.
22. See Begley, supra note 15, at 55.
23. Id. at 52.
24. See id.
25. Id. In fact, with its $250 million price tag, the public project has been a relative
bargain as the task was originally estimated to cost $3 billion. See generally Amy Carroll,
Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433,2435 (1995).
26. Begley, supra note 15, at 52-53.
27. See David L. Wheeler, The Real Impact of the Race to Sequence the Human
Genome, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 16, 1999, at A18.
[Vol. 23:1
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ahead of the original 2005 deadline), 28 aggressive private sector
companies, such as Celera Genomics Corporation, have "vowed to
trounce the public project" and be the first to finish the human
genome sequence.
29
Since 1988, the HGP has dumped billions of bits of data into
the online gene sequence repository known as GenBank, which is
maintained by the National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI) at the NIH in Bethesda, Maryland. 30 Researchers with
Internet connections tap into this DNA-sequence database free of
charge about 650,000 times daily.31 Because most of the genome
contains useless data,32 the primary task involves sorting and
organizing the useful genes, then identifying their protein-coding
elements and the language that guides gene expression (the
process that activates genes to make proteins). 33
The completion of the HGP and the concomitant expansion
of knowledge in molecular and cellular biology are creating the
same kind of excitement experienced by physicists in the early part
of the twentieth century and legal scholars in the 1960s. 34 This
28. Id. The project was originally estimated to take about twenty years to complete.
Id. Some attribute the early completion of the project to the aggressive push of private
genomics companies. Id. As Richard Gibbs, director of the genome center at Baylor
College of Medicine in Houston stated: "[i]t's fair to say we have been stimulated by
industrial pressure to be a little more aggressive." Id.
29. Begley, supra note 15, at 54. Celera's groundbreaking feat came about three
years after the complete sequencing of the first animal genome, that of a common worm,
Caenorhabditis elegans, in 1997. David L. Wheeler, For Biologists, the Postgenomic World
Promises Vast and Thrilling New Knowledge, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 13, 1999, at
A17. Celera's J. Craig Venter was also the first to sequence the entire genome of any
organism when he announced the sequencing of a bacterium that causes ear infections.
Wheeler, supra note 27, at A18.
30. Regalado, supra note 13.
31. Wheeler, supra note 27, at A18. While the public HGP insists on free access,
Celera Genomics, which boasts the world's second-largest supercomputer, is planning to
sell access to customized "suites of genes" (information about "complicated pathways of
gene regulation") to those who wish to compare genomes across many species. Id. Celera
plans to charge universities $5,000 to $20,000 for each laboratory use, but would prefer to
offer a subscription to the entire university at a reduced rate. Id. Meanwhile for $5
million a year, three pharmaceutical companies will get an advance peek at Celera's data.
Id. at A19. To assure its future profitability, Celera plans to identify at least 100 to 300
genes that it will patent and then license the rights for commercial development to other
companies. Id.
32. Regalado, supra note 13.
33. Id.
34. See Wheeler, supra note 29, at A17. As the authors of the Bilbao Declaration
stated: "[n]ever, at least since nuclear fission, has science presented humanity with
opportunities and dilemmas of such magnitude and complexity." 4 FUNDACI6N BBV,
2001]
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genomics revolution is transforming biology. For example, biology
departments at universities rush to create new species of scientists
in fields such as bioinformatics, molecular epidemiology,
molecular evolution, functional genomics and pharmacogenetics
(using gene tests to fashion drug therapy), and biomedical
computing.35 At the same time, many U.S. corporations are
staking out dominant positions in this new frontier and enriching
their stockholders in the process.
36
Much genome mining is characterized by a marriage between
computer science and biology, as scientists use DNA chips to
detect patterns in thousands of cells as they are turned on and
off.37 The new science relies on algorithms and the advanced
pattern-recognition capabilities of neural networks to find the
hidden structure in massive amounts of molecular data.38 These
pattern-recognition algorithms are designed to scour genetic
databases in order to discover and interpret the functions of
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: LEGAL ASPECTS 365 (1994) [hereinafter THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT, VOL. IV].
35. Wheeler, supra note 29, at A17. Many major universities have also taken steps to
prepare for the future of biology by establishing institutes dedicated to the scientific,
ethical, legal, and economic dimensions of the genomics revolution. Regalado, supra note
13. A side-effect of the biotech revolution has been the steady "brain drain" of academics
including astrophysicists, mathematicians, and other computational scientists migrating
from the Ivory Tower to high-paying private sector fields such as bioinformatics. Id.
36. There are already several genomics companies with enormous market
capitalization as well as cutting edge products or projects. Adam Bryant, The Gold Rush,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 65. Affymetrix, a so-called "pick and shovel" company (an
allusion to the fact that the only people who made real money during the California Gold
Rush were those who sold supplies to miners), developed the famed GeneChip system
that analyzes gene sequences and other activity on disposable microchips. Id. Similarly,
PE Biosystems developed powerful technological devices for analyzing genomics data. Id.
Other companies such as Celera Genomics and Incyte are software service companies that
supply genetic information databases to subscribers. Id Human Genome Sciences, Inc.
(HGSI) stands out as a pioneer and leader in the use of genomics and in moving these
genomics-based drugs into patient-based clinical trials. See Human Genome Sciences,
Corporate Profile, www.hgsi.com/cprofile/index.html.
37. Regalado, supra note 13; see also Bryant, supra note 36, at 65. Some of these
specialized computer chips have the capacity to perform over four-thousand genomic
analyses simultaneously. Kenneth Manton, The Vital Role of Economists in Realizing
Medicine's Golden Age, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 18, 2000, at B5. This calculating
power makes it possible to complete the genomic analysis of a grain of rice in eight weeks
instead of the ten years'predicted by the Japanese government a few years ago. Id.
38. Regalado, supra note 13. For more about the fantastic abilities of advanced
neural networks, see RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN
COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1999) and also, RAY KURZWEIL, THE
AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES (1990).
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genes.39 The knowledge obtained is crucial to the development of
new genetic therapies.
40
The primary focus of genomics is shifting the analysis of
sequences and structures of genes into a discussion about their
function and the uses of the proteins based on genes or
proteomes.41 For the genomics industry, the task ahead lies in
mining the benefits of the genome to create new genetic therapies,
to detect and fight diseases and even to enhance genes by
amplifying normal genes to make them better.42 By 2010, genetic
screening tests will enable individuals to gauge their unique health
risks, including tolerance for cigarettes. 43 Genetic science will be
used to fix and predict health problems, and by 2050 "many
potential diseases will be cured at the molecular level before they
arise." 44 There is hope that the new genetic discoveries will trigger
the invention of new pharmaceuticals, including drugs aimed at the
causes of diseases, not just the symptoms.45 Doctors will prescribe
different treatments for different patients according to their
specific genetic profiles.46 In fact, one of the most promising
avenues of genetic medical research is the process of identifying
and analyzing single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).47 SNPs
are the smallest forms of genetic variation between individuals.
48
There is great research interest in determining how these
variations affect the presence or absence of disease, the intensity
of disease, and the response to drugs.49 Classic gene therapy,
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See Wheeler, supra note 29, at A17.
42. Arnold J. Rosoff, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 291, 293 (1999) (reviewing MAXWELL J.
MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO
EQUALITY (1998)).
43. Geoffrey Cowley & Anne Underwood, A Revolution in Medicine, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 10, 2000, at 58.
44. Id. The official U.S. government web site claims the HGP "will reap fantastic
benefits for humankind, some that we can anticipate and others that will surprise us."
About the Human Genome, supra note 13. Information gleaned from the study of DNA
and technologies developed will "revolutionize future biological explorations." Id. In
addition, "learning about nonhuman organisms' DNA sequences can lead to an
understanding of their natural capabilities that can be applied toward solving challenges in
health care, energy sources, agriculture, and environmental cleanup." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Wheeler, supra note 27, at A19.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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which treats ailments by harnessing useful genes and inserting
corrective genes into patients, holds great promise despite a few
initial tragic mishaps. 50 Meanwhile, there are great expectations
for other forms of gene therapy designed to restrain harmful genes
by interfering with the genes' production of proteins or by
blocking the action of the disease-causing proteins.51 The gold
rush to harvest the fruits of the HGP is proceeding at a quick pace,
prompting some to call for an international convention that
designates the genome as a CHH.52
III. IS THE HUMAN GENOME A COMMON HERITAGE?
There appears to be a prevailing opinion in the international
community that the human genome is, or should be, designated as
a common heritage of mankind (CHH).53 The CHH principle
disavows state sovereignty over commonage and mandates or
recommends that the benefits from common areas be allocated to
all humankind, including future generations. 54 The CHH principle
(and interpretations of the principle) is also shaped by ideology,
legal philosophy, and/or political bias.55 Additionally, CHH areas
may not be subject to appropriation by state or non-state actors
and they must be used solely for peaceful purposes.56  All
humankind has a right to participate in the management of the
CHH, and economic benefits derived from exploiting the CHH
area must be shared by all.57 Scientific research in CHH areas
should be free and open.58 Finally, it is claimed that the CHH
50. See, e.g., David Wheeler, Patient Dies in Gene Therapy Trial at the University of
Pennsylvania Medical Center, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 8, 1999, at A23; see also,
Cowley & Underwood, supra note 43, at 61. The process of keeping RNA from
generating harmful protein may entail a bombarding of the RNA with "anti-sense"
molecules that block out parts of its sequence. Id. at 62.
51. Cowley & Underwood, supra note 43, at 61.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra notes 54, 56, 59 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Article, the
term "CHH" is used as an acronym for both the phrases "common heritage of
humankind" and "common heritage of mankind."
54. For an extensive discussion of the shifting meanings and alternative
interpretations of the common heritage principle, see J.M. Spectar, Saving the Ice Princess,
NGOs, Antarctica & International Law in the New Millennium, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 57,59-60 (2000).
55. See generally id.
56. Christopher Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 35 CoMP. L.Q. 191,192 (1986).
57. Id. at 192.
58. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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principle necessitates technology transfers from North to South, so
the South can effectively develop and participate in resource
extraction from the CHH.59  The CHH principle has been
suggested for or used as a major theme for governance of global
environmental and resource regimes, including the seas, the moon,
Antarctica, and plant genetic resources.
60
Even prior to the involvement of formal institutions in the law
of genomics, the international community shared an emerging
consensus that the human genome was a CHH.61 The Human
Genome Organization (HUGO) has taken a leading role in
preserving the genome as a CHH since its founding in April
1988.62 HUGO is composed of 239 consultants from about two
dozen countries who seek to promote genomics research,
coordinate between countries, and facilitate the study of ethical,
legal, and commercial issues surrounding the project. 63 HUGO
maintains that "the human genome is our common heritage and
collective property," and genetic information is "in the public
domain."64
59. See Rudiger Wolfrum, Common Heritage of Mankind, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1989).
60. See generally Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
14 INT'L LAW. 429 (1980); ARVID PARDO, THE COMMON HERITAGE: SELECTED PAPERS
ON OCEANS AND WORLD ORDER 1967-1975 (1975); ELISABETH MANN BORGESE, THE
FUTURE OF THE OCEANS: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME 125-33 (1986); Spectar,
supra note 54; Joyner, supra note 56.
61. Barbara Looney, Should Genes be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy:
Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 231,238-39 (1994).
62. 1 FUNDACI6N BBV, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: LEGAL ASPECTS 78
(1994) [hereinafter THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, VOL. I]. The group of scientists that
founded HUGO (at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) included the renowned geneticist,
James Watson. Id.
63. Sturges, supra note 4, at 231.
64. See HUMAN GENOME ORGANIZATION, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 10 (1992). Watson was shortly
thereafter appointed NIH Associate Director for Human Genome Research. Id. At first,
the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) wanted to play the
lead role in coordinating and facilitating research efforts, but was persuaded by HUGO to
step aside. Id. HUGO argued that the task would be best performed by a more
specialized body whose sole purpose was the human genome. See Allyn L. Taylor,
Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to Advance
Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479,541 (1999).
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The Bilbao Declaration of 1994,65 adopted after the seminal
international meeting on "Legal Aspects of the Human Genome
Project, 66 also represents a key step forward in designating the
human genome as another CHH.67 The Declaration posits that
"the benefits of the Human Genome Project affect the entire
world, and its results belong to the human beings of this and future
generations, and not to the scientists . . . or to the countries
supporting them." 68 The Bilbao Declaration noted that the HGP
"has to develop in a truly global, interdisciplinary manner and its
effects must benefit the whole of humanity without distinction of
race, continent, creed or opinion. All human beings without
exception are involved in it. The issue is nothing more or less than
the future of humanity." 69 The convergence of extant political,
social, and technological trends "imposes on this generation the
obligation of working together for the benefit of future
generations and for all the species inhabiting the planet. '70 As the
Bilbao Declaration further noted, "it would be a travesty of justice
if its benefits were not to be made available to all human beings in
every country." 71 The Bilbao Declaration echoes a key aspect of
the CHH principle when it posits that scientific research "will be
essentially free, with no limits other than those imposed by the
researcher's own self-control. ' 72 Further, out of respect for human
dignity, the human body "must not be subject to
commercialization," 73 although free and "controlled availability" 74
to the human genome will be allowed for therapeutic or scientific
purposes. Finally, the Bilbao Declaration states that genetic
65. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, VOL. IV, supra note 34, at 363.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 364.
68. Id. at 365. The international meeting on the HGP, held in Bilbao, Spain, in May
1993, brought together over two-hundred leading scientists and jurists from over eighteen
countries. Id. at 363. The gathering included several prominent judges, four Nobel Prize
winners, pioneers of the HGP, and private industry representatives. Id. The Bilbao
Declaration summarized the "principal questions raised, the reflections arising, and the
conclusions reached." Id. at 364.
69. Id. at 363-64.
70. Id. at 364-65.
71. Id. at 365.
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id.
74. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
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knowledge "belongs to humanity and must be freely
communicated. "75
Meanwhile, the U.N. Educational, Social, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) also played a central role in developing
the notion that the genome is a CHH.76 UNESCO became
involved with the scientific and social issues of the genome in
January 1989, when it formed the Scientific Coordination
Committee for the Human Genome.77  In 1997, UNESCO
adopted the seminal Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR). 78 This Declaration
notes that the human genome "underlies the fundamental unity of
all members of the human family, 79 and also states the genome is,
"[iln a symbolic sense . . . the heritage of humanity." 80
Furthermore, the "[b]enefits from advances in biology, genetics
and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made
available to all, with due regard to the dignity and human rights of
each individual 81 and "[t]he human genome in its natural state
shall not give rise to financial gains." 82 It is hoped that genomics
will "offer relief from suffering and improve the health of
75. Id.
76. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, VOL. I, supra note 62, at 78. Later in June
1989, UNESCO, along with the members of HUGO and the government of the USSR,
participated at an international conference on the HGP in Moscow, sponsored by the
Council on International Cooperation on the Human Genome. Id. at 79. In February
1990, UNESCO sponsored a debate on the ethical issues of genome. Id. at 80.
77. Id. at 80.
78. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, U.N.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 29th Sess., 26th plen. mtg. at 41, U.N.
Doc. 29 C/Res. 16 (1997) [hereinafter UNESCO]. It is hoped that the Declaration will be
followed by the development of an international convention on the human genome. See
Taylor, supra note 64, at 507-08. The UNESCO-sponsored International Bioethics
Committee (IBC) produced the Declaration. Id. The IBC is comprised of experts in the
fields of medicine, biology, genetics, philosophy, anthropology, law, and other human and
social sciences. Id. The IBC's primary goal was to spark dialogue on, inter alia, the ethical
issues raised by genomics and to build consensus for international norms on the genome
and human rights. See id.
79. UNSECO, supra note 78, at 42.
80. Id. Numerous international organizations were consulted, including the World
Health Organization, the U.N. Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the International
Labour Organization (ILO). See Taylor, supra note 64, at 508-09. The Declaration was
completed by a committee of government experts from eighty-one states and adopted in
November 1997. See id. at 509.
81. UNESCO, supra note 78, at 44.
82. Id. at 43.
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individuals and humankind as a whole." 83 The UDHGHR exhorts
nations to encourage measures enabling "the capacity of
developing countries to carry out research in human biology and
genetics, taking into consideration their specific problems, to be
developed and strengthened. '8 4  States must ensure that
developing countries "benefit from the achievements of scientific
and technological research so that their use in favour of economic
and social progress can be to the benefit of all."'8 5 Finally, the
UDHGHR encourages the free exchange of scientific knowledge
and information in the areas of biology, genetics, and medicine, as
well as peaceful uses of the fruits of the HGP.8 6 The U.N. General
Assembly adopted the UDHGHR in March 1999.87
The application of a CHH approach to the human genome is
viewed as a necessity by some commentators, especially because of
the genome's similarity (by analogy) to internationally designated
common areas such as the seabed and the moon.88 In addition,
others warn of the "grave ethical consequences of privatizing the
genome[,]"'8 9 an essential aspect of human identity.90  The
application of the CHH approach to the genome is favored by
some because it preserves the resource for future generations,
rather than merely focusing on economic interests.91 Furthermore,
the human genome, literally the source code for human life,92 is an
integral part of every person and constitutes "the manifestation of
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 45.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The Human Genome and Human Rights, U.N. Res. 53/152, 53d Sess., Agenda
Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (1999). For a general understanding of the
UDHGHR and its contents see Human Rights and Bioethics, U.N. ESCOR, 58th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/1999/63 (1999); Human Rights and Bioethics, U.N. ESCOR, 67th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/71 (1997).
88. See Sturges, supra note 4, at 248. Sturges compares the human genome to
"frontiers," similar to Antarctica and the moon, and she emphasizes the need for a
"balance of power between developed and developing countries." Id. at 250. She also
contends that the relative ignorance of the world community about the genome and the
grave social implications of the HGP mandates a CHH approach. Id. at 248-50. Given
that most of humanity lacks the basis to make a knowledgeable decision to surrender its
claims to this new frontier, a CHH approach would protect the interests of all humankind,
including the interests of future generations. See id. at 249.
89. Id. at 248.
90. See id. at 249.
91. See id.
92. Id.
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our evolution." 93 Hence, it ought to belong to all humanity as a
CHH.94 The DNA structure that each person inherits-the result
of millions of years of evolution and natural genetic variation-
should not be appropriated by private corporations because of the
potential for abuse, which includes insurance and job
discrimination. 95 It is also argued that applying the CHH principle
to the genome will increase the likelihood of international
collaboration and increase the benefit to the world community.
96
Another claim is that joint ownership and management in a CHH
framework will increase the likelihood of preserving the genome in
the international public domain, leaving it completely accessible
and intact for future generations. 97 Additionally, the application
of the CHH concept to the genome would balance the interests of
both developed and developing countries, thus protecting the
interests of developing countries that are unwilling or unable to
patent and exploit genes.98 Finally, an agreement giving the
human genome CHH status could provide an orderly regime that
alleviates state concerns about protecting their investments.
99
Various international human rights norms provide additional
justification for a CHH approach to assure access to the benefits of
the human genome. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) 100 states, "everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family." Some suggest that "a radical reading"
of Article 25 of the UDHR "would require that individuals be
given full medical access to the medical benefits generated by the
HGP."''1 Similarly, Article 27 of the UDHR also provides some
support for CHH-style genome governance as it grants all persons
a right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement. 10 2 This
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 250.
96. Id. at 251.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 252.
99. Id. at 251.
100. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (11I), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 25, at 140, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
101. Iles, supra note 1, at 36.
102. Looney, supra note 61, at 239. Every human being is effectively part creator or
author of the genome, therefore there may be a collective claim to the "material interests"
resulting from the HGP in the spirit of Article 27. Id. See Darryl Macer, Public Opinion
on Gene Patents, 358 NATURE 272, 272 (1992) (quoting the Universal Declaration of
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position is echoed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, 10 3 which states
that "everyone has a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications.' 1 4 According to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,10 5 everyone
has "the right .. . to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health" 10 6 and similarly all are
entitled "[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications.' 1 7  While states are primarily responsible for
guaranteeing these rights to their own populations, there may be
an expanding obligation to implement the right to health through
international assistance. 10 8 This obligation arguably extends a
duty to support community genetic services in poorer countries,
particularly because one can hardly isolate the health concerns of
one nation from others.
10 9
IV. THE LIMITS OF CHH GOVERNANCE
Concerns over investment security and the development and
protection of technology (including the vexing matter of technology
transfers associated with CHH approaches) weaken the prospects
for consensus in the seabed and moon regimes. The following case
studies will illustrate the difficulties of reaching a binding CHH
agreement due to the perception that the CHH will undermine
investment security, retard technological development, and lead to
mandatory technology transfer provisions. In addition, even
negotiated agreements sometimes remain unsigned or unratified
because of the perceived effect of the CHH on technology and
investment. As these case studies reveal, technology and investment
are critical variables in understanding, explaining, and predicting the
Human Rights, supra note 100, art. 27, at 140).
103. World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., 22nd mtg., pt. 1, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; see also Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the
Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, G.A. Res. 3384, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
2400th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3384 (1975).
104. Vienna Declaration, supra note 103, at 24.
105. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, arts. 12-15, at 8-10, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967).
106. Id. art. 12, at 8.
107. Id. art. 15, at 10.
108. See Taylor, supra note 64.
109. See id.
[Vol. 23:1
2001] Fruit of the Human Genome Tree
likelihood of public and private U.S. support for a prospective
international convention on the human genome.
A. Technology, Investment, and Seabed Resources
Ironically, the technological developments in the 1950s that
increased the likelihood of profitable commercial exploitation of
the manganese nodules in the seabed and other ocean resources
1 1 °
precipitated the CHH negotiations of the last three decades.
111
The anticipated commercial value of these ocean resources and the
sunk costs of investments in technology, as well as other valuable
economic interests, 112 are critical variables that shaped the
intensity of opposition to the CHH in the seabed.
113
110. Ross D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (1979). While the focus has always been on the manganese
resources of the seabed because of their direct link to the common heritage question, the
United States also has sizable deposits of hydrocarbons, particularly if offshore
hydrocarbons beyond the two hundred-meter isobath are included. Id. at 92. In 1972, the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated domestic proven reserves of oil to be about 6%
of the world's total. Id. Almost 10% of all U.S. oil reserves and 15% of natural gas were
offshore within the two-hundred-meter isobath. Id. Changes in technology increasingly
make offshore drilling comparable to or better than land drilling. Id. Robert R. Nathan
Associates estimated the economic rent of offshore oil and natural gas production was
about $3.9 billion in 1973 and was expected to climb to $7.7 billion in 1985 and $9.4 billion
in 2000 (they calculated economic rents in part by examining the opportunity cost of
offshore output, measured by the cost of replacing it with oil imports). Id. at 96. These
estimates far exceeded the estimates of future economic rents to the United States from all
other oceans uses combined. Id. Most of these revenues were captured by the public at
large. Producers captured only about one-fifth of these rents owing to the continuation of
petroleum price controls, reduced tax incentives for drilling, tighter environmental
controls, increased drilling at greater depths, increased entry by new oil producers, and
higher front end bonus payments to U.S. federal and state governments for offshore leases
(these exceeded $3.0 billion in 1973 alone). Id. at 112. The oil industry wanted the USGS
to "assert ... its exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral resources of the entire submerged
portion of the Continent off its shores." BARRY BUZAN, SEABED POLITICS 105 (1976).
111. Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., Johnson Asks Joint Exploitation of Sea Resources, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1966, at 10. Seeing the imminence of a sea-grab for manganese nodules,
President Johnson called for a new regime for the seas, advocating a modest precursor of
international governance of common spaces. Id. President Johnson urged nations to
cooperate in this exploitation and avoid "a new form of colonial competition for the
oceans' riches." Id. "We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and hold the lands under
the high seas .... We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and
remain, the legacy of all human beings." Id.
112. ECKERT, supra note 110, at 72. In 1972, Robert R. Nathan Associates estimated
that avoiding the most important economic straits (the English Channel, Gibraltar, and
Malacca) would cost the United States $51 million. Id. A study prepared for the U.S.
Treasury estimated that if every nation along shipping routes imposed an extended
territorial sea and an expanded no-pollution zone, U.S. oil shipping costs would increase
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The age of seabed exploitation began with the remarkable
findings of the Glomar Explorer.114 The vessel, initially owned by
the U.S. government, was outfitted with innovative fixed area
dredging technology to scour the ocean bed for nodules. 115 Later,
the expeditionary voyage of HMS Challenger116 revealed that
potato-sized manganese nodules lay at the deepest regions of the
Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, with the latter containing
about one trillion tons of manganese. 117 It is estimated that the
total amount of nodules increases by about ten to sixteen million
tons annually.
118
Finding and dredging the manganese nodules is a very labor-
intensive process. 119 Approaches to deep seabed mining include
continuous path dredging, continuous line bucket dredging, and
fixed area dredging. 120 Deposits occur in irregular patches and the
richest deposits tend to be found in undulating hills or highly
obstructed or inaccessible regions of the seabed. 121 At best, only
about half of the deposits in a field will be harvested.
122
In the 1970s, the mining industry was increasingly
overoptimistic about the feasibility and desirability of commercial
exploitation of the deep seabed. 123  Between 180 and 460
by about $137 million annually or about $3.4 billion over a twenty-five-year period. Id.
(citing David B. Johnson, "Comparative Costs for Oil Shipped by Alternative Routes
from the Persian Gulf to the United States," Office of the Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs and Research, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Washington, D.C. (May 24,
1974)). Nevertheless, while these straits had a positive value for the United States in
economic terms, "closure of such straits would affect the U.S. in ways that are less than
devastating." Id. at 73. In 1976, U.S. coastal areas within two-hundred miles accounted
for about 82% of the tonnage and 68% of the value of all commercial catches by U.S.
fishermen. Id. at 133-34. Foreign fishermen took in 78% of the total value of fish caught
between the twelve-mile and two hundred-mile contours. Id. at 134. While tonnage in
catches increased, certain species were over-fished. Id. Foreign fleets exploited half of the
fourteen over-fished species. Id.
113. See generally id.
114. See id. at 220.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 214. The HMS Challenger was a wooden steamship that set out on an epic
scientific exploration of the oceans in 1872. Id.
117. Id. at 215.
118. Carl Q. Christol, An International Seabed Authority, in THE LAW OF THE SEA:
ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 172, 179 (Don Walsh ed., 1977).
119. ECKERT, supra note 110, at 219-20
120. Id. at 217.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 224.
123. Id. at 237.
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commercially exploitable sites were thought to exist, of which
eighty to ninety were prime sites.124 Ocean mining became
increasingly appealing to U.S. miners as the extraction costs for
land-based mining continued to mount.125 In particular, a decline
in assays accounted for the rising costs of terrestrial mining in the
United States. 126 The average content of Canadian and U.S.
copper declined from 0.82% to 0.71%.127 Also, rising prices of
land-based minerals increased the probability of viable seabed
production.
128
"[A]pprehensions that terrestrial mineral sources could be
cartelized successfully[,] much like oil supplies[,]' 129 also caused
U.S. miners to look to the sea.130 In addition, concern over future
prices of land-based minerals wildly fluctuating created an
additional incentive for finding new substitute sources of supply at
sea.131 In a 1976 study, David B. Johnson and Dennis E. Logue
projected that a significant portion of U.S. demand and imports
could be satisfied by deep-sea sources by 2000.132 In addition, a
proliferation of environmental restrictions increased costs of
terrestrial mining in the United States.133 Thus, U.S. miners were
enticed by the prospect of an ocean mining industry that would be
"free of both political interference and restraints on
production."'13
4
The nodules of the deep seabed contain four minerals-
manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt-that are widely used by
U.S. industries. 135 Because every nodule contains portions of all
four metals, the mining industry was enticed by the prospect of
producing a variety of metals from the harvested nodules. 136 Also,
several minor metals such as molybdenum, vanadium, zinc, and
silver are some expected by-products.
137
124. Id.
125. Id. at 226.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 232.
133. Id. at 226.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 226-27.
136. Id. at 230.
137. See id.
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The minerals in the seabed nodules have a wide variety of
commercial applications. Manganese, which makes up about half
the mineral content of the seabed nodules, is primarily used in
steel-making to add strength or remove impurities. 138 It is also a
key ingredient in dry-cell batteries. 139 Nickel is also used in steel-
making because of its ability to resist corrosion. 140 Steel alloys,
particularly stainless steel products, are widely used in the U.S.
consumer goods industry as well as in the production of capital
goods, such as jet planes, refined petroleum, and pollution-control
equipment. 141 The U.S. Department of the Interior estimated that
nickel will be the most lucrative metal from sea-based mining.
142
It was expected that higher nickel prices would stimulate new
investments in land and sea mining, but that ocean sites would
have lower investment costs.143 Cobalt, a by-product of processing
nickel and copper ores, is the most expensive of the four metals.
144
It is often used in the manufacturing of permanent magnets and
steel alloys.145 Copper has the largest world market among the
four metals with the United States being the world's major
producer. 146 It is used extensively for electrical conductivity and
fighting corrosion. 14
7
A study conducted for Congress by Robert R. Nathan
Associates assumed that three U.S. firms would produce about
seven million tons of nodules per year. 148 They estimated that the
total value of manganese nodule mining activity in 1985 would be
about $534 million (at 1973 prices), a third of which would be
attributable to ocean mining.' 49 It was estimated that supply
would outstrip demand, thus leading to a slump in the prices of
cobalt and manganese. 150 While this would reduce the value of
marine output in a commercial sense, in an economic or
138. Id. at 226.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 227.
142. Id. at 229.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 227.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 232.
149. Id. at 233.
150. Id.
[Vol. 23:1
Fruit of the Human Genome Tree
opportunity cost sense, the substitute marine minerals would be
worth at least as much as the terrestrial minerals. 151 In fact, the
sea-based minerals could be worth even more if lower prices
caused increased consumption. 152 Nevertheless, assuming that
only the price of cobalt declined, Robert R. Nathan Associates
estimated the United States would receive $33 million in economic
rents in 1985, and about $65 million in 2000.153 If the by-products
of cobalt also displaced U.S imports, estimates of economic rents
could go as high as $51 million in 1985, and $95 million in 2000.154
The commercial value of seabed minerals, the costs sunk into
investments in technology, as well as other valuable economic
interests, 155 have shaped the intensity of the opposition to the
CHH principle.
156
B. Technology, Investment, and Moon Resources
As the exploitation of lunar resources became increasingly
feasible, many businesses expressed concerns over the impending
CHH regime.1 57 While there were no immediate plans for lunar
exploitation, 158 there were ongoing scientific and research projects
that could have been jeopardized by the Moon Treaty as
proposed. 159  At the height of lunar exploration, several
corporations initiated efforts that could be "translated to the
exploration phase of the mining of off-earth materials in the next
twenty or thirty years." 160  Many businesses and scientists had
already reserved room on the space shuttle to carry their research
projects into space. 161
The Apollo program and various planetary missions, such as
Viking and Voyager, 162 revealed the availability of silicon,
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 234.
154. Id.
155. See generally id.
156. See infra Part IV.C.
157. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 163-64 ("[Tlhe treaty
unacceptably increases the investment risk associated with successful commercial
exploitation of extraterrestrial materials.") (statement of Mr. Edward Bock, Project
Engineer at the Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation).
158. Id. at 92.
159. See id. at 84, 93.
160. Id. at 93.
161. Id. at 84.
162. Id. at 37.
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aluminum, and iron ore on the moon's surface that could be used
for the construction of large space structures such as the Solar
Power Satellite.163 Titanium, magnesium, and high levels of
hydrogen can also be found on the moon. 164  An Earth-
approaching asteroid one-kilometer in diameter has about $1
trillion worth of steel-which is as much as the world produces in
twenty years.
165
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
studies in the 1980s indicated there were "no insurmountable
technological impediments to the exploitation of extraterrestrial
resources."1 66  In order to make such ventures economically
competitive, however, methods needed to be developed to process
materials and fabricate system components in the unique
environment of space, while minimizing transportation charges
and operational costs.167 The introduction of tele-operated and
robotic systems technology appeared to be the enabling key to the
exploitation of the space resources of energy and materials.
168
While estimates were difficult,169 NASA calculated "that in the
period 2000 to 2010 a viable capability could be tested through a
technology readiness demonstration."
170
The entry stake is extremely large-only very well-financed
public or private entities can engage in moon exploitation. 171 It is
estimated that an economic investment of approximately the scale
of the Apollo program would be required to reach this lofty
objective. 172 The NASA studies estimated start-up costs between
$50-$100 billion. 173  The size of the "front-end" investment
narrowed the possible industries to the production of electrical
energy for terrestrial use. 174  The concept involved the
manufacture and assembly of huge arrays of solar cells in space.
175
163. Id.
164. Id. at 44, 145.
165. Id. at 163.
166. Id. at 45.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 153.
172. Id. at 45.
173. Id. at 153.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Because the United States buys $50-$100 billion of oil from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
176
countries annually, some suggested that the United States should
be prepared to consider an investment of this size because it could
reduce energy dependence.
177
During the Senate Moon Hearings, Mr. Edward Bock, a
representative of General Dynamics Corporation, testified he was
optimistic about the future technology for moon exploitation 178
and indicated it was possible to develop a lunar materials
production facility.179  Mr. Bock further testified that
extraterrestrial sources of certain resources may be far more
important than comparable alternatives such as those found in the
seabed: 1
80
Use of extraterrestrail [sic] resources for in-space construction
of large earth services satellites is one application for which
seabed resources and substitutions are unlikely to compete.
Utilization of extraterrestrial materials for applications on earth
may also prove to be economically attractive. Innovative
techniques for inexpensive delivery of space processed
materials down through Earth's atmosphere have been
proposed by qualified scientists. If these techniques prove to be
feasible, and expansion of U.S. space activities encompasses
technology permitting asteroid retrieval, then inexpensive
resources obtained from space will be a reality.181
C. Two Cautionary Tales: Technology, Investment, and the
Common Heritage
Business interests are hostile to the CHH principle because of
its presumed impact on the development of technology and
investment security. 182  In particular, U.S. businesses are
concerned about the multiple meanings associated with the CHH
and the climate of uncertainty created by the principle. 183 A major
difficulty in applying the CHH regime in a commercial context is the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 155.
179. See id. at 154.
180. Id. at 161.
181. Id.
182. See Spectar, supra note 54, at 63-65.
183. Id. at 68
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lack of consensus about the precise meanings of its elements and
associated concepts. 184 Many business interests view the CHH
principle as "ill-defined and elusive." 185 Because the CHH lacks a
single "fixed, well defined, and generally accepted meaning,"'
186
skeptics argue that it cannot be the basis of substantive
obligations.
187
There exists a considerable difference between the North and
South as to the meaning and scope of certain key aspects of the
CHH in the moon and seabed regimes. 188 At the core of the
North-South division over CHH is the notion that the principle
mandates large-scale technology transfers from North to South
189
on favorable and equitable terms.190 The controversial technology
transfer element, perhaps more than any other aspect of the CHH,
is interpreted selectively and according to geo-political bias (the
North-South divide) or economic interests, thus precipitating
discordance and deadlock.191  Thus, the technology transfer
element of the CHH principle, as advanced by the South, is
generally in conflict with Northern conceptions of free enterprise,
particularly intellectual property rights. 192 As one commentator
argues, the appurtenant principles of the CHH all mean "central
economic planning and control of the development and marketing
of resources." 193 Centralized planning, involving joint ownership
and management of the resource for the benefit of humankind,
presumably justifies North-South wealth transfers, as well as
mandatory transfers of the technology needed to exploit common
resources. 194 The general opinion is that technology transfer
provisions are essentially part of a Third World plan "to gain
control of critical raw materials and to gain access as a matter of
right to the technology needed to exploit them."'
195
184. See, e.g., id. at 65.
185. Gillian D. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: Some Jurisdictional Problems, in
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 99 (Gillian
D. Triggs ed., 1987).
186. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 20.
187. See Triggs, supra note 185, at 101.
188. Spectar, supra note 54, at 60-64.
189. Id. at 60.
190. See id. at 69.
191. See generally id. at 60-65.
192. Id. at 64.
193. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 120.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 220.
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The view that the CHH includes a duty to provide
preferential technology transfers or financial assistance to procure
appropriate technology to the South has been incorporated into
significant international legal instruments by the U.N. General
Assembly (UNGA)-largely at the instigation of the Third World
majority. 196 The seminal Declaration on the Establishment of the
New International Economic Order (NIEO) 197 recommended
North-South technology transfers198 and "preferential and non-
reciprocal treatment for developing countries." 199  The UNGA
also adopted, on the same day, the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order.2
00
The South also codified the new legal and economic order,
which included technology transfers, in the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UNGA in 1974.201 The
Charter linked the NIEO agenda with CHH ideology,20 2 and it
affirmed the necessity of North to South technology transfers in
Article 13.203
Many critics, particularly the American Mining Congress
(AMC), a trade association comprised of U.S. companies that
produce most U.S. metals, coal, and industrial and agricultural
minerals, argued that the CHH principle would slow U.S.
technological innovation.20 4 The AMC was especially active in its
opposition to the CHH principle on grounds that it impeded
196. ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1974 209-11 (Joseph T.
Vambery ed., 1976).
197. Id. at 208.
198. Id. at 211.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 212. The Programme begins: "In view of the continuing severe economic
imbalance in the relations between developed and developing countries ... urgent and
effective measures need to be taken by the international community to assist the
developing countries ...." Id.
201. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
202. ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1974, supra note 196, at 259.
The sea-bed ... , as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of
mankind .. .the benefits derived therefrom are [to be] shared equitably by all
States, taking into account the particular interests and needs of developing
countries; an international rdgime applying to the area and its resources and
including appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions
shall be established by an international treaty of a universal character, generally
agreed upon. Id.
203. Id. at 255.
204. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 35.
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technological development and reduced investment security. 20 5
The AMC's opposition was particularly significant because it was
perhaps the largest stakeholder, representing over 300 companies
that manufacture mining, milling, and processing equipment and
supplies. 20 6 In addition, the AMC represents commercial banks
and other institutions providing services to the mining industry and
the financial sector.20 7
The members of the AMC viewed the CHH principle and its
technology transfer provisions as fundamentally incompatible with
requirements of private investment in the development of natural
resources. 20 8 To them, the CHH principle represented a "system"
of total international control over access to, and disposition of, key
resources to effect North-South transfers of wealth and
technology.20
9
Some members of the AMC such as the United Technologies
Corporation (UT) mounted a vigorous public campaign against
the Moon Treaty, lobbying members of Congress as well as the
general public.210 UT claimed a seabed-style CHH regime means
strict production controls, technology transfers, and one-nation-
205. Id. at 141.
206. Id. at 139.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 141. The CHH clearly has an entrenched meaning in the developing world,
and this meaning has been repeatedly buttressed in public statements particularly because
it has become a rallying point for the NIEO. Id. at 144. Thus, while the United States
maintained that the CHH meant freedom of access, the Group of 77 (G-77) and others
insisted that the CHH meant common ownership. See generally Spectar, supra note 54, at
61 (stating that in 1955, the G-77 was composed of newly independent states who lobbied
for their economic and political interests).
209. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 141. The United States was
prepared to accept the deep seabed regime even with the offending characteristics "in
order to obtain international agreement on a wide variety of ocean law questions
perceived as important to our national interest." Id.
210. See PHILIP W. QUIGG, A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUES OF
ANTARCTICA 175 (1983). United Technologies (UT) ran an advertisement in The
Washington Post on February 14,1980, claiming that through the Moon Treaty, Third
World Nations supported by the Soviet Union are seeking to exploit the United Nations to
create a new order in which free enterprises of the industrialized West would be
subordinated to the wishes of so-called non-aligned nations, guided by the Eastern bloc.
The basic goal is redistribution of the world's wealth. Id. at 177. UT based its assessment
of the implications of the CHH on the Law of the Sea model. Senate Moon Treaty
Hearings, supra note 12, at 220. Like other American businesses, UT feared a CHH
regime for the moon would be similar to a Law of the Sea Treaty regime, hostile to private
enterprise. Id.
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one-vote decision making as opposed to consensus.211  The
company also contended that the United States would suffer great
harm because under CHH regimes, it would have to surrender
many of the advantages of its current technological leadership. 21
2
For example, UT believed the proposed Moon Treaty would limit
the ability of the aerospace industry to develop space resources.
2 13
In sum, the CHH concept was perceived as a key part of an overall
Third World strategy to secure "fundamental redistribution of
global wealth.
214
Another major complaint of the mining industry was that
activity in the industry was stymied by the absence of a firm U.S.
policy and by the slow deliberations of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 215 Arguing that the important
technical barriers had been removed, the ocean miners called for
the removal of the political and legal uncertainties represented by
the CHH.216 While expressing confidence about the ability of the
industry to overcome any technical hurdles, a prominent
representative of a mining firm stated, "the technology is ready;
the investment climate is not."
217
Further, the political and legal uncertainty created by the
CHH negotiation process was further exacerbated by the
perception that estimates of economic rents were low when
compared with the number of ocean mining companies and the
sizable investments they were planning to make.218 This factor
may have contributed to the demand for legal assurances that
mining sites that had been prospected and explored at
"considerable expense" would not be "usurped by rival mining
firms" or jeopardized by the imminent UNCLOS treaty.219 There
was a real fear that the emerging CHH regime would further
squeeze already tight margins. If the seabed authority
monopolized nodule production and/or tampered with market
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. ECKERT, supra note 110, at 237.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 234.
219. Id. at 237.
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prices, the import substitution would have a negative impact on
U.S. consumers.
220
Also, U.S. business interests were concerned that a treaty that
"established substantial royalties or taxes on ocean mining, or
retroactively modified the boundaries of mine sites" would be
inimical to the economic interest of the investors with sunk
costs.2 2 1 There was further concern that the emerging CHH
regime could reduce the rents these consortia could otherwise
collect.2
22
In addition, ocean miners were understandably reluctant to
enter into the most expensive and risky phase of their activities in
a climate of uncertainty. Ocean miners would be making financial
commitments in excess of $500 million, without possessing deeds
to mining sites from a governmental authority, nor assurances
from the miners' own government that an unfavorable treaty to
ocean mining would not be negotiated without an indemnification
of their previous investments. 223 Uncertainty about the potential
success of deep-sea mining also made bankers wary. 224 Hence,
many of the consortia involved had to obtain direct financing.225
Bankers were especially worried that UNCLOS was moving
towards a CHH regime that was "unfavorable to mining by private
firms."
226
With regard to the Moon Treaty, the consensus in the
business community appeared to be that the CHH approach
"unacceptably increase[d] the investment risk associated with
successful commercial exploitation of extraterrestrial
materials." 227 Although there were no immediate plans for lunar
exploitation, many U.S. businesses had invested substantial sums
in scientific, research, and commercial projects in preparation for
extraterrestrial mining that could have been placed at risk by the
application of CHH to the moon.228 As one observer remarked:
220. Id.
221. Id. at 237.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 236.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 237.
227. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 164.
228. Id. at 84.
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It is doubtful that these pioneers were aware at the time of
commitment to their projects that the U.S. Department of State
was engaged in negotiations designed to declare celestial bodies
and their resources to be the common property of mankind to
be administered by a future international regime, this being the
meaning attributed to "common heritage" by most nations of
the world, including the Soviet bloc and some 119 less
developed countries.
229
In addition, commercial interests were uncertain about the
powers and operating procedures of a future international regime
on resource exploitation.230 Many believed that the Moon Treaty,
as proposed, could "slow industry's involvement by introducing
additional uncertainties into the investment/return equation."
231
Moreover, U.S. businesses believed that because of the ambiguity
of the CHH principle, the Moon Treaty would limit free enterprise
initiatives in outer space. 232
At the time of the Moon Treaty hearings, some developing
countries may have had their own perception of what common
heritage means. Their perception, one commentator suggested,
was not one that any mining company would want to go along with
while considering an exploration program for the moon.
233
According to the prevailing view, a CHH regime for the moon:
[W]ould not be desirable relative to traditional U.S. interests in
market-oriented economic principles and in decentralized,
pluralistic political principles. Further, to the extent that the
regime incorporated stringent production controls, it would be
undesirable from the perspective of global consumers and those
concerned with the problems associated with the exploitation of
limited global resources.
234
Corporations were unwilling to engage in fifteen to twenty
years of expensive research and development if there was a
significant risk that it would be politically impossible for the
company to recoup its investment.235  Dr. Charles Sheffield,
President of the American Astronomical Society, noted that parts
229. Id. at 84-85.
230. Id. at 16.
231. Id. at 93.
232. Id. at 16.
233. Id. at 100.
234. Id. at 171.
235. Id. at 92.
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of the Moon Treaty could be read as signifying a ban on private
enterprise in the moon.236 For example, Article 11(3) stated:
"Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part
thereof or natural resources in place, shall become the property of
any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental
organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or
of any natural person."
237
According to Dr. Sheffield, the Moon Treaty's terminology is
unclear and the resulting ambiguity discourages private
investment.238 Dr. Sheffield was disappointed that U.S industry
leaders were not consulted as to a treaty addressing the
exploitation or use of the moon's resources.239 He scorned the
belated consultation of industrialists, stating, "only now, when the
treaty is a finished written report and a fait accompli, is industry
being heard from and asked to provide inputs." 240 There were
also economic concerns about the time-phased revenues and
vague, speculative assessments of return on investment
information.241 Dr. Sheffield stated:
No one has any idea what it would cost to produce a ton of a
particular mineral from extraterrestrial sources, because there
are such large uncertainties in two areas: the cost of systems to
extract minerals away from earth (including, of course, the costs
to go there and return); and the abundance of appropriate
minerals. These parameters may not be known well enough for
another thirty or forty years to encourage a private investment
group to operate on a for-profit basis in the field of off-earth
mineral exploration.
242
Meanwhile, according to members of the Space Futures
Society (SFS), 243 the Moon Treaty was designed to place obstacles
236. See id.
237. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Treaty), G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR 34th sess., Supp. No. 46, at 79,
U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979).
238. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 92, 100.
239. Id. at 86.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 92.
242. Id. at 92. Dr. Sheffield notes that merely because such exploration is presently
difficult does not mean that exploratory activity may never occur in the future. Id.
Companies presently have an interest in determining the parameters of extraterrestrial
resource exploitation. Id.
243. Id. at 231. SFS is a non-profit organization dedicated to the industrialization and
eventual humanization of space.
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to the United States' development of an industrial base. 244 The
SFS argued that even the principle of equitable sharing of benefits
extends to more than simply the financial realm: "the principle has
also been used to justify insistence on mandatory transfer of the
technology used to exploit the resources." 245 According to the
SFS, the Moon Treaty put the United States at a disadvantage in
the proposed international regime and deprived the United States
of "control over [its] economic destiny."
246
SFS further argued that should this draft treaty be adopted,
entities interested in making use of non-terrestrial resources would
have to deal with the threat of such a moratorium and a regime
that could tax it or drive it out of business. In addition, such a
regime would force them to give up the competitive edge they had
developed by having to "share" technology with the U.N.
regime.247 According to SFS, this clearly represents a risk that no
corporation or nation could afford to take.
248
Other critics of the Moon Treaty suggested that the United
States make unilateral reservations favorable to U.S. industry
because of the Treaty's negative effects on the development of
technology.249 Dr. Art Morrissey, Senior Policy Analyst at the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, suggested that when the
Moon Treaty was submitted for ratification, a declaration should
be tendered that explicitly stated that "the common heritage
language would not be a limiting aspect for American industry.
'" 250
Similarly, two representatives from the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) suggested that given the
present uncertainties with the Moon Treaty's language, the United
States should withhold ratification until it was reworded to include
certain interpretations and understandings.251 Dr. Louis Friedman
and other AIAA members made it clear that they did not
necessarily oppose the Treaty.252 In fact, they claimed indifference
as to the "legal details" of the Moon Treaty. 253  Their focus,
244. Id.
245. Id. at 120.
246. Id. at 231
247. Id. at 232.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 35.
250. Id. at 36.
251. Id. at 97.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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instead, was on the state of technological development. 254 For the
Moon Treaty to be helpful, the United States also needed to spend
resources on research and development to have a viable, thriving
space policy and program.255 The pressure from these interest
groups and individuals affected the pace, process, and outcome of
the negotiations.2
56
The U.S. government, especially the Departments of Defense
and State, had concerns about the CHH principle's effect on U.S.
technological leadership and investment security. 257 On the whole,
most U.S. policymakers feared that a technology transfer provision
would be harmful to the United States' national security. 258 In the
Export Administration Act of 1979, Congress expressed concern
about exporting technology that could enhance the military
capability of other nations at the expense of the United States.
259
One commentator observed that, to the extent that a CHH regime
incorporated mandatory technology transfer provisions, such a
regime might be "undesirable from the perspective of national
security interests."
260
Policymakers and legislators also blamed CHH politics for
retarding the development and use of technology required in order
to exploit the areas governed by CHH policies. As Senator
Schmitt opined, UNCLOS had a "tremendously adverse effect on
the rapid development on the technologies and management
systems to work the resources of the deep sea." 261  The United
States was strongly opposed to the view that the CHH principle
mandated a pre-regime moratorium, arguing that the net effect of
such a moratorium would be "to destroy any incentive for the
development of the [needed] technology, either for use
experimentally or for its mass production." 262 In a study of U.S.
policy at the seabed negotiations, one observer concluded that the
United States was "not at all interested in sharing its technology
254. Id. at 98.
255. See id.
256. See generally Spectar, supra note 6 (discussing the role of interest aggregation and
articulation in shaping presidential positioning in regime formation in the global
commons).
257. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 220.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 171.
261. Id. at 43.
262. Christol, supra note 60, at 462.
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with others." 263  Therefore, regimes that include technology-
sharing provisions, are the "lowest ranked alternatives" for the
United States.
264
There were still some inconsistencies and contradictions in
the U,.S. stance as some administrations appeared to take a more
lenient view towards technology transfer provisions.265 As the
U.S. stake in developing an orderly and efficient seabed regime
increased, the United States showed a greater willingness to make
some trade-offs in technology transfers in return for securing free
and open access to the CHH.266 For example, the United States
wished to gain support from more moderate Third World states
for a proposal that included the right of private parties, as well as
the United Nations' Enterprise,267 to mine the seabed. In an effort
to gather this support, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger promised a
modest and limited transfer of technology to the United Nations
and Third World. 2
68
Similarly, the CHH principle received modest support from
NASA Administrator, Dr. Robert Frosch, who observed that the
potential chilling effect of UNCLOS on investment might have
been overstated. 269 Furthermore, as S. Neil Hosenball of the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space testified, "there is
nothing in the [Moon] [T]reaty that prevents development of
technology" by private or public concerns.270
In addition to the concerns that would come from accepting
the technology transfer required by the CHH principle, other
problems may have arisen if the United States did not accept these
provisions. For example, if national security interests prevented
the technology transfer required by the CHH, the regime that
emerged could have been undesirable from the standpoint of U.S.
mining interests, especially if they could not operate profitably. 271
263. WILLIAM E. WESTERMEYER, THE POLITICS OF MINERAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT IN ANTARCTICA 175 (1984).
264. Id.
265. See Spectar, supra note 6.
266. Id.
267. A 1976 Austrian proposal for a compulsory licensing system provided for one
entity, known as the Enterprise, to be formed between any state and the U.N. Authority
for each mining operation. Id. at 993.
268. Id. at 992.
269. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 42.
270. Id. at 52.
271. Id. at 220.
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Others argued that it was in the United States' national
interest to participate in regimes that encouraged U.S.
technological development. 272 Dr. Friedman contended that the
Moon Treaty would be useful if, as a doctrine of policy, it
encourages the government to boost development of celestial
resource exploration. 273 In Dr. Friedman's view, the document
itself was unimportant; what mattered was the United States'
technological leadership.274  If the United States maintained
technological leadership by, inter alia, boosting research ,and
development, the views of other states would be irrelevant. 275 In
effect, the technological edge would give the United States the
ability to dominate the emergent moon regime in much the same
way that the United States dominated Intelsat (International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization).
276
Dr. Friedman was concerned that by abdicating its role in the
moon regime, the United States might hinder technological
development.277 For the United States to be placed in a position
comparable to one that it enjoyed in Intelsat, there would have to
be strong federal research and development support for space
technology. 278 Returns from moon investments are too long-range
and risky-federal research and development support is required
to spur private industry.279 A General Accounting Office report
indicated, however, an insufficient emphasis on space processing
research by space industry planners.280 At the time, NASA had no
lunar research scheduled and since 1971, the United States had
spent "hardly a nickel on the [m]oon." 281 In the meantime, the
Soviets continued to develop and accelerate manned space
272. Id. at 99.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 100.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 98. Intelsat is an organization founded in 1964 by the telecommunication
agencies of eighteen nations, including the United States, who proposed the organization.
6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPiEDIA BRITANNICA 339 (15th ed. 1988). "Intelsat owns
communications satellites and the ground stations from which they are controlled, but the
transmitting and receiving apparatus in each country is owned by the Intelsat member
from that country." Id.
277. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 98.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 98, 99.
280. Id. at 98.
281. Id.
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operations.282 In fact, the Soviets were reportedly planning to
build a permanent space station to use as a staging platform for
manned flights to the moon and Mars.283 Consequently, some
policymakers were more concerned with the U.S. government's
abdication of its leading role as a lunar pioneer than they were by
the purported effect of the CHH negotiations on technology.284
Nevertheless, the opponents of both treaties persisted, and
ultimately succeeded in defeating both treaties. In general, the
opponents viewed the Third World (G-77) demands as antithetical
to "U.S market-oriented and pluralistic interests." 285  The
proposed mechanisms for technology transfers created an
expansive and regulatory regime that could undermine private
investment. 6 Many of the concerns of U.S. businesses centered
on the widening implications of the CHH principle and the nature
of the future CHH regime for the seabed and the moon.287 In
addition, many feared the Moon Treaty limited or foreclosed "free
enterprise initiatives in outer space because of the ambiguity of the
'common heritage' concept. ' 288
The negative perceptions of the CHH principle, including
uncertainties about its precise legal implications, probably caused
the Carter Administration to withhold support for the Moon
Treaty.289 Although the CHH principle of the moon regime did
not include the requirement of technology transfer, opponents
successfully placed the treaty in the same category as UNCLOS. 290
As a result of a successful lobbying campaign by the Treaty's
opponents, the United States refused to sign or ratify the Moon
Treaty.291
Meanwhile, UNCLOS affirmed the technology transfer
component of the CHH principle. UNCLOS stated that the U.N.
Authority shall "promote and encourage the transfer ... of such
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 170.
286. Id. at 16.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 3. Growing criticism of the Treaty led the Carter Administration to defer its
final approval or disapproval of the Treaty until after the 1980 elections. Id. Carter lost
the election to Ronald W. Reagan.
290. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 168.
291. See Spectar, supra note 54.
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technology and scientific knowledge so that all States Parties
benefit therefrom." 292  Nevertheless, any technology transfers
have to be based on fair and reasonable commercial terms. 293
Given the wide-ranging powers of the International Seabed
Authority, many analysts viewed Part 11 of UNCLOS as "a regime
in compliance with the demands of the NIEO. ' 294
The South's success in creating a CHH provision with a
significant technology transfer component at UNCLOS, however,
may have been a short-lived pyrrhic victory. In 1981, the newly-
arrived Reagan Administration rejected the negotiated agreement
and called for significant revisions. 295 The Reagan Administration
desired changes in the provisions that would "not deter
development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet
national and world demand. '296 In addition, President Reagan
insisted that the Convention should not contain provisions creating
serious commercial difficulties, including provisions for the
mandatory transfer of private technology.
297
V. LESSONS LEARNED
The resuscitation of the CHH principle in a global context
necessarily requires inclusion of North-South technology transfers
to improve access to, and allow equitable allocation of, the
benefits of commonage. Meanwhile, the demand for technology
transfers or the quasi-legislation of technology transfers triggers
intense negative reactions in Northern nations where private
292. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 12, at 1294.
293. Id.
294. Willy Ostreng, The Conflict and Alignment Pattern of Antarctic Politics. Is a New
Order Needed?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 433, 438
(Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991).
295. See CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVES OF THE
REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS: THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY OF U.S.
POLITICAL & MILITARY POLICY 1981-1991, at 90 (1995).
296. Id.
297. Id. Eventually, the Clinton-Gore administration signed the seabed provisions but
only after it had taken steps to clarify and limit the scope of the CHH principle. Letter
from Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, to Ronald Reagan, U.S. President (Sept. 23,
1994) (recommending that the Convention and the Agreement be transmitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to accession and ratification) (on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review). The new Agreement of 1994
modifies Part XI of the Convention and it gives specific meaning to the common heritage
principle as it applies to the mineral resources of the seabed beyond coastal state
jurisdiction. Id.
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business interests are concerned with the protection and
development of proprietary technology as well as investment
security.
298
Controversies over the impact of the CHH scheme on
technology development and investment security demonstrate the
limits, efficacy, and acceptability of common heritage governance.
In particular, concerns over technological development and
investment security had significant consequences for the nature
and outcomes of negotiations in the global commons.299 Both the
UNCLOS and moon regime negotiations were unduly protracted,
largely because of the North-South discord over the CHH
provision and its likely impact on the development of technology,
property rights, and investment security. 300  Despite general
support for a free and open access concept of the CHH in both the
seabed and the moon regimes, the North was ambivalent towards
the continually expanding and evolving CHH concept, specifically
the attempts by the South to secure transfers of proprietary
technologies. 30 1 Ultimately, the United States was much less likely
to support strict and/or ambiguous CHH regimes that appeared to
threaten technological development and investment security.
Plans to apply the CHH approach to the human genome must
reflect the lessons of the seabed and moon regime case studies.
These examples demonstrate that the normative aspirations of CHH
governance often clash with other interests such as technology
development and investment security. While the human genome
may indeed be the new CHH, the concept has been tainted by the
rancorous North-South polemics over its application in the seabed
and the moon regimes. Given the baggage carried by the concept, its
injection into a prospective genomic convention may stir the
simmering North-South debate. If the negotiators of a prospective
genomic convention ignore the history and lessons of previous
regime negotiations, they could find themselves reenacting the
interminable, tragicomic posturing so long associated with the
North-South tangle.
While the South often views an unrestricted CHH provision as
a panacea for a potpourri of perennial maladies, the moon and
298. See Sturges, supra note 4, at 251.
299. Senate Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 12, at 171.
300. Id. at 141.
301. Id.
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seabed examples demonstrate that commercial interests in the North
are likely to be undermined by a wide-ranging CHH provision. As
concerns over technological development and investment security
mounted, the United States often became less willing to enter into a
binding CHH agreement. As a result, the escalating demands for
technology transfer precipitated the rejection of the seabed and the
moon treaties.
302
Given the recent emergence of genomic stakeholders
30 3
interested in protecting technological development, investment
security, and other interests of great commercial value, one can
anticipate strong resistance to any CHH scheme that imperils these
vested interests.3
04
Post-Cold War international law-making holds great promise
for re-invigorated cooperation and profitable partnerships
between North and South.30 5 The drafting of a human genome
convention presents policy makers with an opportunity to
transcend the tempestuousness, acerbity, and recriminations of the
old North-South debate. The anti-market approaches advanced by
some proponents of the CHH have proven unworkable; therefore,
such a genomic convention should reflect the increasingly
decentralized and market-oriented framework of the post-Cold
War world. Instead of relying on a vertically imposed regime, the
recommendations set forth below lay the groundwork for a process
of horizontal coordination between public and private entities,
including non-governmental organizations.
Given the legitimacy of the competing interests on both sides
of the North-South schism, drafters of a convention should seek
302. Id. at 221.
303. See Bryant, supra note 36, at 65.
304. In March 2000, the stock market, especially the biotech sector, dropped
precipitously when U.S. President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
made comments that caused many investors to believe that the two governments wanted
scientists to "have free access to corporate research on the charting of human genes."
CNNfn, Biotech Takes a Beating: Genomics Shares Slammed Amid Concerns Over Access
to Genetic Data, at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/03/14/companies/biotech/index.htm (Mar. 14,
2000). Human Genome Sciences and Celera Genomics lost about 20% of their stock
prices on March 14, 2000. Id.
305. See J.M. SPECTAR, THE PROMISE OF GLOBAL SOCIETY: MULTI-LEVEL
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF POST-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(forthcoming 2001)(arguing that to manage the critical challenges of twenty-first century
international relations and to secure the benefits of globalization for all humankind, key
elements of civil society and other non-state actors must join state actors in a pluralistic
network of purposeful partnerships).
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win-win solutions characterized by reciprocity and mutuality. It is
hoped that these recommendations will serve as preliminary
guidelines for less hierarchical and more flexible CHH governance
that would satisfy the real concerns of both North and South. The
recommendations are also intended to maximize prospects for
crucial U.S. support of CHH governance for the human genome in
a binding international convention. In addition, the
recommendations provide a new way of thinking about the CHH
principle without the vexing hex of hackneyed North-South
rhetoric, rancor and recriminations. If negotiators of a future
human genome convention follow these guidelines, they would
probably increase the likelihood of protecting the genome as the
CHH, without imperiling the prospects for an agreement by
seeming to jeopardize the development of technology and
investment security. As humankind enters the brave new "Age of
the Genome," one must hope for success.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DRAFTERS OF THE HUMAN
GENOME CONVENTION
The common heritage should be redefined, clarified,
simplified, and limited. A suggested definition for the human
genome reads as follows: the common heritage of humankind for
purposes of the international convention on the human genome
simply means that the raw genetic data or natural material from the
HGP will be freely available to all.
The definition of the common heritage in the convention
must not include the controversial technology and wealth transfer
provisions. Despite the merits of many of the claims, the
convention on the human genome must not be used as the forum
for resolving unrelated and long-standing North-South economic
or political issues. The simpler and more straightforward the
definition, the greater the likelihood of crucial U.S. support for the
emerging regime.
To speed up the pace of negotiations and to increase the
likelihood of agreement, the common heritage aspect of the
human genome convention should be separated from other parts
of the agreement.
To garner the necessary support of developed countries,
particularly the United States, the parties should agree at the onset
of the negotiations that applying the common heritage principle to
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the genome is not intended to prevent genomics companies from
obtaining appropriate patents.
To increase the likelihood of necessary support from
developed nations for a genome convention, the developing
countries should support and enforce appropriate intellectual
property agreements as well as appropriate investment security
guarantees.
To improve access to the fruits of the genome, the
international convention should strongly encourage all states, non-
governmental organizations, foundations, corporations,
universities, and individuals to establish and participate in a
voluntary Human Genome Fund (HGF). This HGF should be
used to purchase revolutionary genomic therapies, necessary
vaccines, or other medicines for direct distribution to countries
and peoples in need, thus accomplishing many of the distributive
justice goals of the common heritage.
In constructive partnerships with genomics companies,
research labs, universities, and state entities, the HGF would focus
its efforts on the discovery, development, and distribution of gene-
based vaccines, therapies, or other medicines necessary to cure or
stave off pandemics such as AIDS or Ebola. The HGF should
provide incentives for genomics companies worldwide to share
their patents for purposes of speeding up drug discovery and
delivery to countries facing pandemics. Charitable foundations
should be encouraged to secure genomics patents and rights to
gene-based therapies on behalf of the HGF. State parties should
be encouraged to provide substantial and commensurate capital
gains tax reductions, deductions, exemptions, credits, and other
preferential economic treatment for corporations or entities
contributing to the HGF. In addition, all research and
development expenses for entities participating in the HGF should
be completely tax deductible. Representatives from non-
governmental organizations, such as HUGO, the International
Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders should be considered for
supervisory/oversight functions in the HGF.
Private genomics enterprises and other involved non-state
entities should be invited to participate in the drafting of the
prospective international convention on the human genome. Non-
state actors, including genomics corporations and non-
governmental organizations, should be consulted for their
expertise with regard to developing market-oriented frameworks
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for increasing worldwide access to the fruits of the genome.
Interested parties, including scholars, jurists, scientists, ethicists,
researchers, and media and business personalities, should be given
full access to the negotiations process as well as to other matters
related to the international governance of the human genome.
Non-governmental organizations with an interest in health
care and access to medicine should be encouraged to form
partnerships with genomics corporations, pharmaceutical
companies, universities, and research labs. These partnerships
should act in concert to develop gene-based cures to epidemics
that threaten global stability. Acting in concert on behalf of
humankind, these partnerships should be encouraged to work in
association with state actors for the purpose of developing new
and innovative ways to distribute the benefits of the common
heritage to the individuals who need drugs necessary to stave off
pandemics.
All states should affirm or reaffirm their support for a
meaningful human right to health care that includes access to any
generally accepted gene-based vaccines or therapies capable of
curing plagues such as AIDS and/or preventing other pandemics.
The prospective convention on the human genome should treat
this right to certain life-saving health benefits of the genome as a
new jus cogens norm in international law. This human right should
create an obligation on the part of states and non-state entities
alike to act in good faith to spread the life-saving benefits of the
genome to all humankind.
Upon proper showing of cause, states should be allowed to
make and enter good faith reservations or unilateral
understandings, regarding their interpretation of the common
heritage or any obligations under this convention. These
reservations and understandings should be given consideration
when determining state responsibility or legal obligation with
regard to the human genome convention.
VII. CONCLUSION
The revolutionary changes heralded by the completion of
the HGP could further widen the gap between the global "haves"
and "have-nots," thus creating a new hotbed of North-South
contention over the global distribution of goods. Although many
international lawyers have been quick to confer the CHH mantle
on the genome, caution must be exercised as this lofty concept has
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often derailed or stymied global resource regime negotiations.
Efforts to place the human genome under CHH governance in a
binding convention, however justifiable and/or desirable, would
probably face stiff resistance from genomic stakeholders.
Given the North's relative power position and its current
monopoly of genomic technology, it would be imprudent for the
South to attempt to wrestle the fruits of the human genome from
the North by using hierarchical anti-market regulatory
frameworks. If the South is to have any chance of benefiting from
this revolution in the near future, it must forge constructive
partnerships with the North. The recommendations posited here
provide key elements of a constructive approach that can achieve
many of the normative aspirations of CHH governance, while
maximizing prospects for crucial Northern support for any
prospective international convention on the human genome. By
adopting these recommendations, the drafters of such a
convention would ensure the widest possible dissemination of the
benefits of the HGP within a framework of North-South
cooperation. If they fail to accomplish this task, it is likely that the
fruits of the human genome tree will remain beyond the grasp of
the world's poorest countries for a very long time to come.
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